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SERVICE CONTRACTS AND THE CISG 
Professor Doctor Ingeborg Schwenzer,* Julian Ranetunge,** 
and Fernando Tafur*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The story of the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods (“CISG” or “the Convention”) is one of worldwide success. It has 
been ratified by 89 states, potentially covering more than 80% of world trade. 
Its profound effect on the law governing the international sale of goods is 
well documented. Despite its name, however, the CISG has the potential to 
be much more than just a sales convention. It can also govern the 
international supply of services. Indeed, according to Article 3(2) CISG, 
mixed contracts1 are subject to the CISG if the preponderant part of the 
obligations of the party who furnishes the goods does not consist in the 
supply of labor or other services.2 In other words, the CISG already governs 
service obligations, albeit those contained within a contract characterized as 
one for the sale of goods. 
Traditionally, when compared with goods, services were viewed by 
economists as non-storable, intangible and non-tradable.3 Modern economic 
analysis takes a different view. Today, many economists point out that “the 
boundaries between manufacturing goods and services are blurring,” and 
regard the debate on the demarcation of services from goods as 
“inconclusive.”4 The ambiguity of the divide between goods and services 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Dean, Swiss International Law School; Professor Emerita of Private Law, University of Basel; 
former Chair, CISG Advisory Council. 
** Barrister (England & Wales). 
*** MLaw (Basel, Switzerland). 
1 Contracts containing both sale of goods and supply of services obligations. 
2 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, at art. 3(2) [hereinafter CISG]. 
3 Broussolle Damien, Services, Trade in Services and Trade of Services Industries, an Analysis 
Based on Hill’s Perspective, 48 J. WORLD TRADE 2 (2014). 
4 Id. at 3. 
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becomes all the more pronounced when considered in light of major modern 
industries engaged in international trade—entertainment and mass media; 
telecommunications; and computer, information and financial services—and 
of the increasing amalgamation of goods and services in “smart” goods or 
the “internet of things.” This recent skepticism towards maintaining a strict 
distinction between sales and services in the field of economics has 
corresponded with a prominent rise in the prevalence of service contracts in 
international trade. The question now arises whether the distinction between 
sales and services can and should be maintained in law. 
Thus far, there has been little discussion of this issue in the context of 
the CISG. Previous literature has focused either solely on arguments about 
the suitability of the CISG to govern service contracts,5 or on the process of 
amending the CISG to include provisions which explicitly govern service 
contracts.6 This Paper takes a different approach by considering the reasons 
why the CISG excludes service contracts from its scope, by undertaking 
comparative analysis of domestic legal systems in their attempt to grapple 
with the distinction between sales and services, and by providing an account 
of how the most contentious provisions of the CISG can be applied to service 
contracts. 
Part Two argues that the most plausible reason why the CISG excludes 
service contracts from its scope is because domestic jurisdictions do the 
same, but that there is no valid reason why domestic jurisdictions do so. In 
fact, domestic jurisdictions continue to struggle with differential treatment 
between sales and service transactions because they have failed to provide a 
clear and consistent basis upon which to distinguish the two and impose 
starkly different consequences of classifying contracts as sales or services 
(Part Three). Part Four argues that there are good theoretical and practical 
reasons for applying the CISG to service contracts, in their guise both as pure 
service contracts and as mixed contracts which are predominantly for the 
supply of services. With reference to cases which apply, without difficulty, 
the CISG to service obligations, it argues that the CISG in its current form 
                                                                                                                           
 
5 ERNST KARNER & HELMUT KOZIOL, ZUR ANWENDBARKEIT DES UN-KAUFRECHTS BEI WERK-
UND DIENSTLEISTUNGEN: AM BESPIEL DER MASCHINEN-UND 
INDUSTRIEANLAGENLIEFERUNGSVERTRÄGE (Jan Sramek Verlag 2015). 
6 LEANDRO TRIPODI, TOWARDS A NEW CISG: THE PROSPECTIVE CONVENTION ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS AND SERVICES 111 (Brill Nijhoff 2015). 
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can govern service contracts by considering the most contentious provisions 
of the CISG in this context. 
II. WHY DOES THE CISG EXCLUDE SERVICE CONTRACTS FROM ITS SCOPE? 
Looking back at the historical development of the CISG, as far back as 
Ernst Rabel’s seminal 1936 work Recht des Warenkaufs, there is a noticeable 
absence of discussion on why the CISG, a convention to promote 
international trade,7 should be confined to contracts for the sale of goods. It 
was only at the Vienna Conference in 1980 that the issue received (brief) 
mention for the first time. The Czechoslovakian representative on the First 
Committee opened discussions by proposing that the CISG should govern 
both sales and service contracts.8 He saw “no reason” why service contracts 
should be excluded from the scope of the Convention. Although the 
Committee rejected this proposal, its exact reasons for doing so are unclear. 
Those who rejected the proposal either did not provide reasons for their 
position or merely stated that it would be “[un]desirable.”9 
In many ways, the Czech proposal had no chance of gaining traction at 
the Vienna Conference. As Honnold reports, at the Conference, 
the time for review of the [Draft Convention of 1978 was] limited . . .[ .] Thus, 
proponents of amendments had a heavy burden: they needed to show not only that 
a change was needed but also that a proposed amendment was clearly drafted and 
would not lead to untoward consequences in relation to other provisions of the 
law.10 
The proposal came too late. The delegates arrived in Vienna under the 
impression they were going to refine a draft convention on the international 
sale of goods, not one on the supply of services. More precisely, the proposal 
was 16 years too late. The 1964 Hague Conventions,11 the predecessors of 
the CISG, contained similar (but not identical) provisions to Article 3(1) 
                                                                                                                           
 
7 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods pmbl., Apr. 11, 1980, 
S. Treaty Doc. No. 98–99 (1983), U.N. DOC. NO. A/CONF. 97/19 (1981), 19 I.L.M. 671 (1980) (reprinted 
at 15 U.S.C.S. app.). 
8 U.N. GAOR, 33d Sess., 2d mtg. at 241–42, U.N. DOC. NO. A/CONF.97/C.1/SR.2 (Mar. 11, 1980). 
9 Id. 
10 JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION 11 (Kluwer Law Int’l 3d ed. 1999). 
11 Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) and Uniform Law on the Formation of 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULF). 
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CISG. For example, Article 6 ULIS (concerning the supply of materials by 
the buyer) pursues the same purpose: to exclude from the convention’s scope 
any contracts in which the parties’ obligations were substantially anything 
other than the delivery of goods for a price. 
This does not mean, however, that the historical development of the 
CISG does not leave behind clues about the reasons for the exclusion of 
service contracts. In 1969, UNCITRAL made a pivotal decision to abandon 
the promotion of the Hague Conventions just five years after their conclusion 
because of a failure to command widespread adoption among states. This 
failure “stemmed from inadequate participation by representatives of 
different legal backgrounds in the preparation of the 1964 Conventions,” 
which were seen as “essentially the product of the legal scholarship of 
Western Europe.”12 Thus, the decision to abandon the Hague Conventions 
was borne out of a desire to create a new instrument that would command 
acceptance across all states in order to enjoy universal adoption. But this 
desire for universal adoption came at a price. UNCITRAL had not only 
instructed the Working Group to produce legislation that would be acceptable 
“by countries of different legal, social and economic systems,”13 it had also 
insisted that decisions be made by consensus. An increase in diversity of 
opinion usually shrinks the areas upon which consensus can be reached. 
Thus, despite having nine years to draft the new convention, the 14 member 
states of the Working Group had limited room for academic debate about the 
inclusion of service contracts within the scope of a convention on the sale of 
goods. They invariably avoided “contestable terms that [were] inconsistent 
with domestic law and thus potentially objectionable to some participants.”14 
These observations about the historical development of the CISG lend 
significant credence to Perales Viscasillas’s suggestion that the CISG only 
excludes service contracts from its scope because Member States do the 
same: they exclude service contracts from the scope of their domestic laws 
on the sale of goods.15 It is highly probable that the CISG’s drafters, when 
faced with the particularly contentious issue over the scope of the 
                                                                                                                           
 
12 HONNOLD, supra note 10, at 9. 
13 Id. 
14 CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT, THE UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 8 (Matthew Bender 2014). 
15 Contracts for the Sale of Goods to Be Manufactured or Produced and Mixed Contracts (Article 
3 CISG), CISG-Advisory Council Opinion, 2004 CISG (Oct. 24). 
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Convention, chose to simply reflect domestic legal tradition. This solution 
avoided the need to confront yet another divisive issue that may have 
compromised the overriding desire for universal adoption. As such, in order 
to understand why the CISG differentiates between sales and service 
contracts, it is necessary to consider why domestic jurisdictions differentiate 
between sales and service contracts. Why do domestic systems organize their 
laws such that sales transactions are governed by largely coherent, sale-
specific laws or codes, while service transactions are not so governed? The 
answer to this question could hold the key to understanding why the CISG 
excludes service contracts from its scope and whether there is any good 
reason for doing so. 
Unfortunately, domestic jurisdictions do not provide explicit reasons for 
differential treatment of sales and services either. Common sense suggests 
two possible reasons. Firstly, since trade in goods was much more 
commonplace in early civilization than trade in services, perhaps laws 
governing sales were developed long before those governing services, and 
the two were never unified. Differential treatment is a result of historical 
accident. However, while it may be true that trade in goods was more 
prevalent in the past, it is not true to suggest that laws governing the supply 
of services are new. Roman law developed its own body of law governing 
the supply of services, and Roman legal scholars themselves were vexed by 
the question of where to draw the line between sales (emptio venditio) and 
services (locatio conductio).16 It is not plausible to argue that this failure to 
treat services and sales laws alike is really a failure to address a historical 
quirk that has prevailed for nearly two millennia. It seems more likely that 
their separation is intentional. 
Secondly, it could be argued that sales and services are treated 
differently in law because of the different standards of liability they entail. 
Sales transactions entail strict liability, derived from contract law. Service 
transactions entail negligent or fault-based liability, traditionally derived 
from tort or delict law. Tort and contract pursue different aims. While 
contract governs voluntary transfers and protects expectations created after 
an exchange of promises, tort governs involuntary transfers and protects the 
                                                                                                                           
 
16 REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF CIVILIAN 
TRADITION 234–35 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996). 
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status quo against wrongful harm. Indeed, it was on this basis that Roman 
law divided duties into those in contract and those in delict.17 Similarly, it 
could forcefully be argued that it is unfair to impose a “duty of result” on a 
service provider. For example, a strict duty on a doctor to cure a patient. The 
problem with this reasoning is twofold. Firstly, unlike other relationships in 
which negligent liability arises, the supply of services does not arise in a 
tortious context. Even though liability in service transactions is frequently 
fault-based, every other characteristic of a service transaction is contractual: 
the parties negotiate, form a contract and seek to have their expectations 
upheld. And while it may be inappropriate to impose duties of result on 
certain types of service provider (e.g., doctors), it may well be appropriate to 
impose such duties on other types of service provider (e.g., construction 
contractors). A similar distinction between two kinds of service transaction 
was recognized in Roman law. While contracts for work and services (locatio 
conductio operis) entailed strict duties of result, contracts of personal 
services (locatio conductio operum) entailed fault-based liability.18 
Secondly, this argument does not account for civil law systems, in which 
sales do not necessarily entail strict liability. One approach in civil law is to 
impose strict liability on the seller only for hidden defects; the buyer accepts 
liability for obvious defects. Another civil law approach only imposes strict 
liability if the seller has either specifically guaranteed the presence of certain 
features or the goods are so defective as to substantially diminish their 
intended use.19 As such, the argument that differential treatment is justified 
because of different standards of liability is unconvincing. In sum, there does 
not appear to be any good reason why domestic jurisdictions organize their 
laws such that sales are treated differently from services. 
                                                                                                                           
 
17 Id. at 10–11. 
18 Id. at 32, 397. 
19 INGEBORG SCHWENZER, PASCAL HACHEM & CHRISTOPHER KEE, GLOBAL SALES AND 
CONTRACT LAW 367, et seq. (Oxford Univ. Press 2012). 
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III. DOMESTIC DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN SALES AND SERVICE CONTRACTS 
Thus far, it has been argued that there is no sound basis on which the 
CISG excludes service contracts from its scope. The Convention only 
excludes service contracts because domestic jurisdictions do the same, but 
the latter offer no sound basis on which service contracts are excluded from 
their sales laws. The following section explores this claim by considering 
(a) the basis on which domestic jurisdictions distinguish between sales and 
services contracts and (b) the consequences of classifying a contract as sales 
or services. 
A. On What Basis Do Domestic Jurisdictions Distinguish Between Sales 
and Service Contracts? 
The basic definition of a contract of sale is the reciprocal exchange of 
goods for a price.20 While exact definitions vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction—the common law, for instance, focuses on the notion of 
tangibility while civil law does not at the outset restrict the definition on this 
basis—the basic definition is the same across all jurisdictions and seems 
relatively clear. By contrast, the basic definition of a contract for the supply 
of services is far less precise. Most civil law systems are content to define a 
service contract as a “contract for the supply of services” without further 
defining what a “service” is.21 The position in common law countries is more 
or less the same. Service contracts are defined widely as, for instance, 
“contract[s] under which a person . . . agrees to carry out a service.”22 These 
wide definitions are usually circumscribed by the removal of discrete kinds 
                                                                                                                           
 
20 Id. at 96. 
21 ALAIN BÉNABENT, DROIT DES CONTRATS SPÉCIAUX CIVILS ET COMMERCIAUX 472 (Librairie 
Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence 11th ed. 2015); PHILIPPE MALAURIE, LAURENT AYNÈS & PIERRE-
YVES GAUTIER, DROIT DES CONTRATS SPÉCIAUX 72 (Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence 8th 
ed. 2016); see also C. CIV. art. 1165 (“contrats de prestation de services” without any further definition); 
and 8 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH § 611. 
22 Australian Consumer Law 2010 (Cth) s 2(1)(a) (Austl.); Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 
c.29, § 12 (Eng.); Consumer Protection Act, 1986, No. 68, § 2(o), Acts of Parliament, 1986 (India). 
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of services from the definition of a “services” contract,23 but this does little 
to clarify the definition. 
Given the vague definition of a service contract, it is unsurprising that 
courts have struggled to distinguish between sales and service contracts when 
classifying mixed contracts. There appear to be two ways of conducting 
classification—two types of tests that are used. The first type classifies the 
whole contract according to its “essence” or “substance.” If “work” is the 
essence of the contract, the entire contract is classified as a services contract; 
if the “delivery of goods for a price” is the essence of the contract, the entire 
contract is one for the sale of goods. This test is followed by most common 
law jurisdictions and a few civil law jurisdictions such as Spain and France.24 
The second type of test, referred to as the “gravamen of the action” test, 
involves splitting the contract into more than one part. The court then applies 
whichever law, sales law or services law, is relevant to the alleged problem. 
For example, in a contract for the removal of old cabinets and the supply and 
installation of new cabinets, the court would apply services law to defects in 
the removal and installation of the cabinets, and sales law to defects with the 
cabinets themselves.25 This approach is followed by Germanic legal systems 
and some French and U.S. courts.26 
Both tests suffer from flaws. The “substance” of the contract test is 
ineffective to deal with those contracts in which neither sales nor services 
dominates. In many ways, it does not make sense to assert that the 
                                                                                                                           
 
23 E.g., Australian Consumer Law 2010 (Cth) s 2(1)(b) (Austl.) (contracts of tenancy, the services 
rendered by an arbitrator, the services rendered by a director to a company); MICHAEL BRIDGE, THE SALE 
OF GOODS ¶¶ 7.150, 7.151 (Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 2014) (Eng.). 
24 CLIVE TURNER, AUSTRALIAN COMMERCIAL LAW 263 (LBC Information Services 21st ed. 1997) 
(Austl.); BENJAMIN’S SALE OF GOODS ¶ 1-041 (Michael Bridge ed., Sweet & Maxwell 9th ed. 2016) 
(Eng.); MALAURIE ET AL., supra note 21, at ¶¶ 11–16 (Fr.); NIMILA BHADBHADE, CONTRACT LAW IN 
INDIA 264 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2010) (India); CARLOS LASARTE, CONTRATOS 108 (Marcial Pons ed., 2008) 
(“characteristic obligation”) (Spain); LARY LAWRENCE, LAWRENCE’S ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-105:88 (Thomson Reuters 3d ed. 2016) (U.S.). 
25 J.O. Hooker & Sons Inc. v. Roberts Cabinet Co. Inc., 683 So. 2d 396 (Miss. 1996). 
26 MALAURIE ET AL., supra note 21, at ¶¶ 12–21 (Fr.); BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL 
CODE] § 311, ¶¶ 24–26 (G. Brudermüller, J. Ellenberger, I. Götz et al. eds., 78th ed., CH Beck München 
2019) (Ger.); Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Nov. 19, 2012, 139 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] III 49, E 3.3 (Switz.); Marc Amstutz & Ariane Morin, 
Einleitung vor Art 184 ff, ¶ 23, in BASLER KOMMENTAR OR I (H. Honsell, N. Vogt, W. Wiegand eds., 
Helbing Lichtenhahn 6th ed. 2015) (Switz.); THOMAS QUINN, QUINN’S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST vol. 1, § 2-102[A][1][a] (Thomson Reuters 2d rev. ed. 2016) (U.S.). 
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“substance” of, for example, a delivery and installation contract is the 
delivery (sales) or the installation (services); one is just as important as the 
other. Indeed, in common law jurisdictions, the case law shows that some 
common law judges have exploited the difficulties with this test to prioritize 
fair outcomes for claimants over consistent classification “according to the 
book.” While there were no form requirements on service contracts, the 
English Statute of Frauds 1677 imposed form requirements on contracts of 
sale.27 This affected judicial approaches to classification. Courts did not want 
contract-breakers to avoid the consequences of breach by claiming that their 
contracts never existed for want of form. As such, courts would classify 
contracts involving the sale of goods as contracts for the supply of services 
so that the lack of conformity with form requirements did not invalidate the 
contract. Thus, courts classified contracts not on the basis of their content or 
terms but on the basis of reaching fair outcomes.28 This purposive 
classification led to the development of artificial, often conflicting, case law 
on determining whether a contract was for sales or services. Unfortunately, 
courts continue to use this old case law as the starting point in deciding how 
a contract should be classified.29 As such, in common law, the classification 
of contracts as sales or services is “often rather fluid.”30 While England has 
abolished these form requirements, some common law jurisdictions maintain 
such requirements (most notably the UCC in the United States)31 and so 
likely continue to espouse a fluid approach to contract classification. The 
shorter limitation period which in the United States applies only to sales 
contracts may be a further factor affecting judicial approaches to 
classification.32 Turning to the second test, the insurmountable difficulty with 
the gravamen of the action test is that parties will find it very difficult to plan 
                                                                                                                           
 
27 Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 
43 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 41 (1974). 
28 Simon Whittaker, Contracts for Services in English Law and in the DCFR, in SERVICE 
CONTRACTS 120 (R. Zimmermann ed., Mohr Siebeck 2010); BENJAMIN’S SALE OF GOODS, supra note 
24, at ¶ 1-041. 
29 See, e.g., the conflicting cases of Lee v. Griffin (1861) 30 LJ QB 252 (Eng.) and Robinson v. 
Graves (1935) 1 KB 579 (Eng.). 
30 Whittaker, supra note 28, at 121. 
31 U.C.C. § 2-201(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977); Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Tas) § 9 
(Austl.); Sale of Goods Act 1895 (WA) § 4 (Austl.). 
32 Frommert v. Bobson Const. Co., 219 Mich. Ct. App. 735, 737–39 (1996). 
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for the legal effects of their transactions if more than one legal regime could 
operate to govern the transaction.33 
In conclusion, neither civil nor common law has found a way to clearly 
and consistently distinguish between sales and services contracts. This 
suggests that there are more similarities than differences between the two, a 
view supported by the analogous application of sale of goods provisions to 
service contracts in the common law.34 In practice, courts have relied on an 
assortment of factors to make a distinction, with little attempt to follow any 
particular rationale.35 
Despite the absence of a clear distinguishing basis, it appears that a 
degree of consensus among legal systems is emerging about the kinds of 
contracts that should be considered “services contracts.” Agency contracts,36 
and consultancy and professional services contracts (rendered by, e.g., 
auditors and accountants)37 are considered by most legal systems to be 
service contracts. It is very likely that franchising,38 licensing,39 distribution 
                                                                                                                           
 
33 1 HAWKLAND’S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-102:2 (W. Hawkland, F. Miller, L. 
Rusch et al. eds., Thomson Reuters 2016). 
34 Clark v Macourt [2013] HCA 56, ¶¶ 8, 30, 55, 68 (Austl.); BENJAMIN’S SALE OF GOODS, supra 
note 24, at ¶¶ 1-031, 1-041 (Eng.). 
35 CISG Advisory Council, supra note 15, at ¶ 1.4. 
36 PETER GILLIES, BUSINESS LAW 470 (The Federation Press 12th ed. 2004) (Austl.); BOWSTEAD 
& REYNOLDS ON AGENCY ¶ 6-012 (P. Watts ed., Sweet & Maxwell 20th ed. 2016) (Eng.); 4 MÜNCHENER 
KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH [MUNICH COMMENTARY ON THE CIVIL CODE] § 611, 
¶¶ 1–2 (M. Arzt, K. Berger, H.-J. Bieber et al. eds., 6th ed., CH Beck 2016) (Ger.); BHADBHADE, supra 
note 24, at 264 (India); Alfred Koller, Dienstleistungsverträge—Begriff, Arten, rechtliche Grundlagen 
[Service contracts—term, types, legal bases] 12 AJP/PJA 1627, 1629 (2014) (Switz.); LAWRENCE, supra 
note 24, § 2-105:81 (U.S.). 
37 Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1 (Austl.); Honeychurch Management Pty Ltd v Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu [2005] TASSC 13 (Austl.); Stone James & Co. v Investment Holdings Ltd [1987] WAR 
363 (Austl.); CHITTY ON CONTRACTS ¶ 14-037 (H. Beale ed., Sweet & Maxwell 32d ed. 2015) (Eng.); 
MALAURIE ET AL., supra note 21, at 287 (Fr.); CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO WARRANTIES § 1.14 
(2015) WESTLAW CCGWARR (last visited Dec. 1, 2016) (U.S.). 
38 Under Swiss Law, franchising contracts are considered mixed contracts with inter alia 
components of labour, rent, and mandate contracts (BASLER KOMMENTAR, supra note 26, at Einl vor art. 
184 ff, ¶ 133). In German law, while the nature of franchising contracts is disputed, they are considered 
by some as mixed contracts with components of lease, sale, rent and contracts for management of affairs 
(BGB, supra note 26, at Einf v § 581, ¶ 22); LAWRENCE, supra note 24, § 2-105:81. 
39 Civil law countries tend to consider license contracts as mixed contracts with components of sale, 
lease, rent and corporate law: HUBERT BITAN, DROIT DES CRÉATIONS IMMATÉRIELLES para. 278, et seq. 
(Wolters Kluwer France 2010) (Fr.); BGB, supra note 26, at Einf v § 581, ¶ 7(Ger.); BASLER 
KOMMENTAR, supra note 26, at Einl vor art. 184 ff, (Switz.). Common law: LAWRENCE, supra note 24, 
§ 2-105:81 (U.S.); H. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9:12 (Thomson Reuters 2016) (U.S.). 
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and legal service contracts40 are also so considered. Turnkey contracts,41 
construction contracts and contracts with architects, engineers and the like42 
are treated as service contracts by the common law, whereas civil law 
countries typically characterize such contracts as contracts for work and 
labor, for which there are special provisions in their respective civil codes.43 
Doctor-patient contracts are considered service contracts by the common law 
whereas the civil law position is unclear.44 It is disputed by common law 
countries whether contracts for the development of software are sales or 
service contracts.45 In civil law countries, such contracts are in principle 
                                                                                                                           
 
40 Though some legal systems may specifically exclude some types of legal services from 
regulation by the general law on supply of services e.g., in England, the services of an advocate in court, 
and in carrying out preliminary work directly affecting the conduct of the hearing, are excluded from the 
supply of services regime (Supply of Services (Exclusion of Implied Terms) Order 1982/1771) (Eng.); 
Giannarelli v Wraith [1988] HCA 52 (Austl.). Under Swiss law, legal service contracts are in principle 
governed by provisions on mandate contracts (BASLER KOMMENTAR, supra note 26, at Einl vor art. 184 
ff, ¶ 272). 
41 Chocolate Factory Apartments v Westpoint Finance [2005] NSWSC 784 (Austl.); JOSEPH HUSE, 
UNDERSTANDING AND NEGOTIATING TURNKEY CONTRACTS ¶ 2-04 (Sweet & Maxwell 1997) (Eng.); 
Semler v. Knowling, 325 N.W.2d 395, 398–99 (Iowa 1982); Speight v. Walters Dev. Co. Ltd., 744 
N.W.2d 108, 115–16 (Iowa 2008); Guaranteed Constr. Co. v. Gold Bond Prods., 153 Mich. Ct. App. 385, 
395 (1986); Reilly Constr. Co. Inc. v. Bachelder Inc., 863 N.W.2d 302 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (U.S.). 
42 GILLIES, supra note 36, at 404; VIVIAN RAMSAY, KEATING ON CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS ¶ 3-
053 (Stephen Furst ed., Sweet & Maxwell 10th ed. 2016); ALFRED HUDSON, HUDSON’S BUILDING AND 
ENGINEERING CONTRACTS ¶ 2-011 (Robert Clay & Nicholas Dennys eds., Sweet & Maxwell 13th ed. 
2015) (Eng.); BHADBHADE, supra note 24, at 266 (India); JAMES WHITE & ROBERT SUMMERS, WHITE & 
SUMMERS’ UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 450 (Robert Hillman ed., Thomson Reuters 6th ed. 2010), 
CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO WARRANTIES, supra note 35, §§ 11.2–4, 11.11 (U.S.). 
43 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 1787–1799(1) (Fr.); BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 
[BGB] [Civil Code], §§ 631–651, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/ 
index.html (Ger.); CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 1544, 1586–1600 (Spain); Obligationenrecht 
[OR] [Code of Obligations] arts. 363–79 (Switz.); Turnkey contracts: Méga Code Civil, art. 1787, para. 
113 (Dalloz ed., 2012) (Fr.); H. PRÜTTING, G. WEGEN & G. WEINREICH EDS., BGB KOMMENTAR § 631, 
para. 19 (Luchterhand Verlag 11th ed. 2015) (Ger.); Lasarte, 283 n.23 (Spain); BGE 114 II 53; Zindel & 
Pulver, Basler Kommentar Obligationenrecht I [OR I] art. 353 n.25, para. 13 (Switz.). 
44 Eyre v. Measday [1986] 1 All ER 488 (CA) (Eng.); State of Punjab v. Shiv Ram & Ors [2005] 
INSC 447 (India); H. Flechtner, Service Contracts in the United States (and from an Economic 
Perspective), in R. ZIMMERMANN, SERVICE CONTRACTS 158 (Mohr Siebeck 2010); WHITE & SUMMERS, 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 448 n.40 (West Academic Publishing 6th ed. 2010) (U.S.) (though some 
kinds of medical contracts found to be sales contracts). 
45 TURNER, supra note 24; St Albans City and DC v. International Computers Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 
481, 492–93 (heavily criticized) (Eng.); WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2.1 n.40 
(West Academic Publishing, 6th ed. 2010); but see Micro Data Base Systems Inc. v. Dharma Systems 
Inc., 148 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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considered contracts for work and services.46 While employment can be 
considered a service, most legal systems place employment contracts outside 
the scope of the “services” regime because of the need for a more bespoke 
regime to protect employees.47 
B. Consequences of Classification as Sales or Service Contracts 
The difficulty courts have with discerning between sales and services 
contracts suggests that there are more similarities than differences between 
the two. Despite this similarity, the classification of contracts as sales or 
services has wide-ranging implications on parties’ relationships. Four main 
consequences of classification are as follows. 
Firstly, classification determines how the contract is regulated by the 
law: by, on the one hand, statute or code, and on the other, judicial discretion. 
Most common and civil law jurisdictions have extensive and well-settled 
codes on the sale of goods, such as the Sale of Goods Act in England, the 
UCC in the United States, the French, Spanish and German Civil Codes and 
the Swiss Code of Obligations.48 By contrast, the laws regulating the supply 
of services are far less organized or coherent. In common law, the rules 
governing the supply of services remain largely uncodified. Such rules are 
found almost exclusively in case law or in general contract law principles.49 
It is true that, in civil law jurisdictions, there is greater codification of rules 
governing services. Codes usually contain specific chapters governing a 
                                                                                                                           
 
46 H. BITAIN, DROIT DES CONTRATS INFORMATIQUES ET PRATIQUE EXPERTALE [Computer 
Contracts Law and Expert Practice] para. 124 (Wolters Kluwer France 2007) (Fr.) (however, if mass-
produced software is delivered with a lifetime license, then they are classified as sales contracts); Palandt 
& Weidenkaff § 433 n.25, para. 9 (Ger.); H. HONSELL ET AL., BASLER KOMMENTAR 
OBLIGATIONENRECHT I [OR I] art. 184 n.26, para. 267 (Helbing Lichtenhahn Verlag 6th ed. 2015) 
(Switz.). 
47 Australian Consumer Law § 2(1) (Austl.); Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, at § 12(2) 
(Eng.); Code du Travail (Fr.); BGB, supra note 43, at §§ 611-630; Bhadbhade, supra note 24 (Kluwer 
Law International 2010) (India); Ley de Estatuto de Trabajadores art. 1 (Spain); Obligationenrecht [OR] 
[Code of Obligations] arts. 319–362 (Switz.). 
48 Goods Act 1958 (Austl.); Sale of Goods Act 1979 (Eng.); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] 
arts. 1582–1685 (Fr.); BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code] §§ 433–479, translation at 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html (Ger.); Sale of Goods Act 1930 (India); 
CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 1445–1537 (Spain); Obligationenrecht [OR] [Code of 
Obligations] arts. 184–236 (Switz.); Uniform Commercial Code art. 2 (2002) (U.S.). 
49 WHITTAKER, supra note 28, at 116 (Eng.); BHADBHADE, supra note 24, at 263 (India); 20 
RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 26:20 (Thomson Reuters 4th ed. 2016) (U.S.). 
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handful of particular types of service contract, such as mandate (agency) 
contracts.50 However, there is no overarching, comprehensive and coherent 
set of rules that govern all types of service contracts.51 This means that, when 
faced with an uncodified service contract, a civil law judge looks to other 
parts of the code to find provisions that are most suitable to apply to the 
services contract. The “law” that is ultimately applied to the uncodified 
service contract is in fact a mishmash of provisions drawn from whichever 
chapters of the code the judge deems most suitable to apply—an approach 
that generates uncertainty for parties about the content of the law that will be 
applied to their dispute. For example, while a Swiss court might apply 
provisions from rent, corporate and labor law chapters to govern franchise 
contracts,52 a German court might apply provisions from rent, lease, sale and 
management of affairs chapters.53 Overall, this absence of codified rules in 
both civil and common law means that the law governing the supply of 
services is difficult to ascertain, unclear and inconsistently applied. Its 
development is left almost entirely to judicial discretion. Secondly, 
classification may have consequences relating to procedural rules, such as 
those mentioned above regarding different form requirements and limitation 
periods.54  
Thirdly, classification usually defines the obligations of the parties. If a 
contract is classified as a sales contract (and, in civil law jurisdictions, as a 
contract for work and labor), the seller owes an obligation de résultat 
(obligation of result); if a contract is classified as a service contract, the 
service provider generally owes an obligation de moyens (obligation of 
means). Under the former, there is a breach of contract if the result has not 
been achieved, regardless of whether reasonable skill and judgment is 
exercised (i.e. strict liability). Under an obligation de moyens, the contract is 
not breached as long as the obligor has used reasonable skill and judgment, 
                                                                                                                           
 
50 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 1984–2010 (Fr.); BGB, supra note 43, at §§ 662–675b; 
CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 1709–39 (Spain); Obligationenrecht [OR] [Code of Obligations] 
arts. 394–406 (Switz.). 
51 MAURITS BARENDRECHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN LAW ON SERVICE CONTRACTS 135–
36 (Sellier European Law Publishers 2007). 
52 H. HONSELL ET AL., BASLER KOMMENTAR OBLIGATIONENRECHT I [OR I] art. 184 n.26, para. 
133 (Helbing Lichtenhahn Verlag 6th ed. 2015) (Switz.). 
53 Palandt & Weidenkaff n.25 Einf v § 581, para 22. 
54 Id. § 3(a). 
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in other words, was not at fault (i.e., negligence liability).55 There are 
instances, however, where classification does not define the standard of 
liability; where, instead, service contracts attract obligations de résultat.56 In 
common law jurisdictions, examples of the kinds of service contracts in 
which strict liability obligations have been implied include construction57 and 
turnkey contracts58 and contracts for the development of software.59 Some 
civil law jurisdictions have also applied strict liability obligations to software 
contracts60 and doctor-patient contracts.61 Strict liability in these 
aforementioned types of service contracts is usually only implied if it is found 
that the service-recipient reasonably relied on the service provider’s 
expertise.62 
The fourth main consequence of classification relates to the availability 
of certain remedies. For instance, in most civil law jurisdictions, the remedy 
of price reduction in cases of non-conformity is only available with sales 
contracts.63 The French Civil Code is the exception: the recent amendments 
which came into force on 1 October 2016 extend the availability of this 
remedy to all contracts.64 In common law, the defence of contributory 
negligence is only available in service contracts.65 This defence reduces the 
                                                                                                                           
 
55 P. MALAURIE, L. AYNÈS & P. STOFFEL MUNCK, DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS [Law of Obligations] 
para. 942 (LGDJ 8th ed. 2016) (Fr.) (the obliger owns “une diligence suffisante”). 
56 CHITTY, supra note 37, at para. 14-37. 
57 Greaves & Co (Contractors) Ltd v. Baynham Meikle & Partners [1975] 1 WLR 1095 (CA) 
(Eng.); NILIMA BHADBHADE, CONTRACT LAW IN INDIA 266 n.23 (Kluwer Law International 2010) 
(India). 
58 HUSE, supra note 41, at para. 2-4; Basildon DC v. JE Lesser (Properties) Ltd [1985] QB 839 
(Eng.); see also Vancouver Water District v. North American Pipe & Steel Ltd and Moody International 
Ltd [2012] BCCA 337 (Can.); MT Hojgaard A/S v. E.ON Climate and Renewables UK Robin Rigg East 
Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 407 (Eng.); Semler v. Knowling, 325 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1982). 
59 St Albans City and District Council v. International Computers Ltd, [1996] All ER 4, 481 n.43 
(Eng.). 
60 Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., 25 Nov. 1997; Cour d’appel 
de Bastia [regional court of appeal], 19 Nov. 2002, 2002/00772; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court 
for judicial matters] com., 1 Mar. 2005, 01-15.007. 
61 DANIEL MAINGUY, CONTRATS SPÉCIAUX [Special Contracts], para. 576 (Dalloz 10th ed. 2016). 
62 WILLIAM A. HANCOCK, CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO WARRANTIES § 11.16 n.34 
(Chesterland, Ohio: Business Laws 1993) (U.S.). 
63 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 441 (Ger.); CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL 
CODE] art. 1486 (Spain); OBLIGATIONENRECHT [OR] [CODE OF OBLIGATIONS] art. 205 (Switz.). 
64 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1223 (Fr.). 
65 N. SEDDON, R. BIGWOOD, M. ELLINGHAUS, CHESHIRE AND FIFOOT LAW OF CONTRACT 1108 
(LexisNexis Butterworths 10th Australian ed. 2012); Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v. Butcher [1989] 
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liability of the breaching party to take account of the aggrieved party’s 
contribution to the breach. For example, the liability of an architect who had 
negligently designed a fire suppression system was reduced by two-thirds 
because the claimants had provided inaccurate information to the architect 
about the appropriate type of fire-suppressing material that should have been 
used.66 
In sum, despite the many factual similarities between sales and service 
transactions, the outcome of the classification exercise undertaken by 
domestic courts has wide-ranging legal consequences on the relationship 
between the parties. Parties to mixed contracts may face uncertainty about 
the extent of judicial discretion in the determination of their dispute, the 
validity of their contract in light of form requirements, applicable limitation 
periods, the standard of liability (résultat or moyen) and the availability of 
certain remedies or defences. This differential treatment runs contrary to the 
legal axiom that like cases should be treated alike unless there is a valid 
reason to treat them differently. It impugns the internal consistency of the 
law, undermines parties’ legitimate expectations, and increases the costs of 
resolving disputes. 
IV. IS THE CISG SUITABLE TO GOVERN SERVICE CONTRACTS? 
Thus far, it has been shown that there is no sound basis on which the 
CISG excludes service contracts from its scope or, indeed, on which domestic 
jurisdictions exclude service contracts from the scope of their sales laws. 
Despite the wide-ranging consequences attached to the classification of 
mixed contracts, there are many similarities between sales and service 
transactions, and it is often difficult to discern between the two. In light of 
this, it is doubtful that sales and service contracts merit differential treatment 
to the extent that they currently do in domestic legal systems.  
                                                                                                                           
 
AC 852 (HL) (Eng.); AVTAR SINGH, LAW OF CONTRACT AND SPECIFIC RELIEF 451 (Eastern Book Co. 
9th ed. 2005); LAWRENCE, supra note 24, § 2-314:560 (This defence is not available where the supplier’s 
obligation is one of strict liability.). 
66 Sahib Foods Ltd v. Paskin Kyriakides Sands [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1832 (Eng.). 
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A. Should the CISG Govern Service Contracts? 
There are convincing reasons why the CISG should govern service 
contracts. Firstly, there are good doctrinal reasons. Not only would it align 
the CISG with modern economic thought,67 it would also fulfil the wider 
purpose of the CISG to promote “development of international trade” and 
“contribute to the removal of legal barriers in international trade.”68 
Secondly, there are compelling practical and commercial reasons why the 
CISG should govern service contracts. Parties engaged in international 
commerce usually want the whole of their relationship to be governed by the 
same system of law.69 However, a prevalent legal problem faced by such 
parties is the application by the court of multiple laws to the same transaction, 
against the parties’ wishes and against commercial sense. Parties to contracts 
governed by the CISG are not immune from these problems. For example, in 
a contract for the delivery, installation and initial maintenance of a factory, 
arbitral tribunals have been known to apply the CISG to the sales part of the 
contract (delivery) but apply domestic law to the services part (installation 
and maintenance).70 Alternatively, the tribunal might find that the value of 
installation and maintenance exceeds—even by a fractional amount—the 
value of delivery, and consequently decline to apply the CISG altogether. 
This creates numerous problems for the parties: greater difficulty in pricing 
risk into contracts and greater uncertainty of outcome in the event of a 
dispute. In addition, the benefits that parties enjoy from the application of the 
CISG to their disputes—its international character, balance between different 
legal cultures and neutrality between the domestic laws of each party—are 
lost. The application of the CISG to service contracts would solve these 
problems. It would mean that a single set of rules would apply to a transaction 
in which goods and services are closely related. 
This Paper, however, goes further than calling for the application of the 
CISG to mixed contracts. It also argues that the CISG should govern “pure” 
                                                                                                                           
 
67 See supra Introduction. 
68 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, supra note 7, at 
pmbl. para. 3. 
69 An assumption made by many legal systems (failing indication to the contrary). See, e.g., Mario 
Giuliano & Paul Lagarde, Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 
282 OFFICIAL J. OF THE EUR. COMMUNITIES 1, 17 (1980); Sulamérica Cia Nacional de Seguros S.A. v. 
Enesa Engenharia S.A. [2012] EWCA (Civ) 638 (Eng.). 
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service contracts—contracts for the supply of services which do not contain 
any sale of goods obligations. The primary argument in favor of this position 
is based on taking existing provisions in the CISG to their logical conclusion. 
If, as is widely acknowledged,71 the CISG already applies to supply of service 
obligations (albeit those found within contracts classified as sales contracts) 
there is no reason why the CISG should not also govern pure service 
contracts. Similar problems call for similar solutions.72 Exactly how the 
CISG would govern pure service contracts will be illustrated later in this part 
with reference to cases already decided under the CISG which apply the 
CISG to service obligations. The question then arises: to what kind of pure 
service contracts is the CISG most apt to govern? The answer to this question, 
this Paper suggests, should draw inspiration from those kinds of service 
contracts which domestic legal systems, by consensus, deem as service 
contracts. These are listed above in the final paragraph of part 3(a). This 
would mean that, for instance, cases such as RT v WT73 (regarding a turnkey 
contract) and the Market Study case74 would be decided differently and 
brought within the scope of the CISG. For the avoidance of doubt, parties 
may wish to specify in their pure service contracts that the CISG does indeed 
apply.75 
                                                                                                                           
 
70 A problem anticipated three decades ago by Peter Schlechtriem. See PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, 
UNIFORM SALES LAW—THE UN-CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF 
GOODS 31 (Manz 1996). 
71 E.g., HONNOLD, supra note 10, at 58. 
72 Id. at 60. 
73 HG Zürich [HG] [Commercial Court] July 7, 2002, HG000120/U/zs (Switz.) (contract to plan, 
deliver, assemble, and initially operate a plant for the breaking down and separation of cardboard 
packaging). 
74 OLG Köln [OLG] Aug. 26, 1994, 19 U 282/93 (Ger.) (contract to conduct scientific study of 
specific segment of German express-services market). 
75 A course of action endorsed by many authorities, including Peter Schlechtriem. SCHLECHTRIEM, 
supra note 70, at 30; United Nations Commission on International Trade, Legal Guide on Drawing Up 
International Contracts for the Construction of Industrial Works 304, U.N. DOC. NO. A/Cn.9/SER.B./2 
(Aug. 1987). 
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B. Can the CISG Govern Service Contracts? 
Previous literature has given no more than cursory consideration to the 
issue of how the CISG’s provisions might apply to non-sales contracts.76 
What follows is a more extensive consideration of this issue, together with 
examples of case law which applies the CISG to service obligations. 
1. Requirements to establish liability 
The following issues surrounding liability for breach of a services 
contract will be considered: determining conformity (Article 35 CISG), third 
party rights or claims to the services rendered (Articles 41 and 42 CISG), 
obligations to examine the service and give notice of defects (Articles 38, 39 
and 43 CISG) and causation by the aggrieved party (Article 80 CISG). 
Article 35 CISG, sub-articles (1) and (2) respectively, set out the two 
ways in which conformity of goods can be established. According to Article 
35(1) CISG, goods must comply with the contractually stipulated quantity, 
quality, description and packaging. In the absence of contractual stipulation, 
Article 35(2) contains fallback provisions designed to objectively establish 
whether performance is in conformity with the contract. It asks what rights 
and duties reasonable persons in the shoes of the parties would have agreed 
to if they had put their minds to such a question. Goods must be fit for their 
ordinary or particular purpose, conform to any sample and be adequately 
packaged. 
The primary objection to including pure service contracts within the 
ambit of the CISG is that the provisions of the CISG are not suitable for 
service contracts. In particular, Karner and Koziol argue that the CISG is not 
suitable to govern conformity in service contracts because of the absence of 
provisions on reasonable care and skill. The first point to note about these 
arguments is that they only concern one kind of breach of contract—non-
conformity—and do not concern other types of breach, such as delayed 
performance and complete non-performance.77 This is because the specific 
                                                                                                                           
 
76 See, e.g., FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 37 (Oceana 
Publications eds. 1992). For slightly more detailed consideration, see generally PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, 
INTERPRETATION, GAP-FILLING AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE UN SALES CONVENTION (Martin 
Koehler trans., Pace Law School Institute of International Commercial Law eds. 2004). 
77 KARNER & KOZIOL, supra note 5, at para. 79. 
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provisions with which Karner & Koziol take issue—Articles 35, 46(3) and 
50 CISG—are only applicable if the goods do not conform to the contract. 
The significance of this is that their objections do not hold currency in cases 
of non-performance and delayed performance. It cannot be argued that non-
performance and delayed performance merit different treatment as between 
sales and service contracts.78 This is evidenced by civil law codes which 
apply rules on non-performance and delayed performance to all kinds of 
contracts, sales and services alike.79 
It is still, of course, important to address Karner & Koziol’s arguments 
as made in the context of non-conformity. It is submitted that the definition 
of liability in Article 35(1) CISG is appropriate for any kind of contract, 
including services contracts, because it is primarily the stipulations of the 
parties which determine their obligations. Conformity with stipulated quality 
will be the main issue in service contracts, but an issue with conforming 
quantity may also arise, for instance, if a service is contracted to be rendered 
twice a week but is instead rendered once a week. In rare cases packaging 
may also play a role in service contracts.80 As the criterion of description was 
specifically included to address problems arising in the sales laws of civil 
jurisdictions,81 it is unlikely to apply to service contracts. 
The provisions in Article 35(2) CISG can also be applied to service 
contracts. It was noted above that service contracts can attract two kinds of 
implied terms: those of résultat and those of moyens. Firstly, in contracts in 
which it is reasonable to expect a service to produce a result, the Article 35(2) 
CISG provision on fitness for purpose can be used as a benchmark to 
determine conformity in the same way it is used in sale of goods cases. This 
raises the question: In what kinds of contracts would it be reasonable to 
expect a service to produce a result? Guidance can be found both in existing 
                                                                                                                           
 
78 Id. at paras. 73, 78 (referring to employment contacts). 
79 See in the respective civil codes the general provisions for contracts. OBLIGATIONENRECHT [OR] 
[CODE OF OBLIGATIONS] arts. 1–142 (Switz.); BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] 
§§ 241–347 (Ger.); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 1101–1369-11 (Fr.); CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] 
[CIVIL CODE] arts. 1088–1213 (Spain). 
80 E.g., a service contract to repair a machine might require proper packaging before the machine’s 
return. 
81 SCHWENZER, HACHEM & KEE, supra note 19, at para. 31.15 (the distinction between aliud and 
peius). 
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laws82 and in harmonization projects. The Principles of European Law on 
Service Contracts extend obligations de résultat to construction, processing, 
storage and design contracts on the basis that, in these contexts, a reasonable 
service-recipient in the same circumstances as the service-recipient 
concerned would have no reason to believe there was a substantial risk that 
the result envisaged would not be achieved by the service.83 This is useful 
guidance for a court which finds itself considering the kinds of service 
contracts which might attract strict liability standards found in Article 35(2) 
CISG. Article 35(2) CISG has already been applied to determine the 
conformity of service obligations where strict liability was imposed, for 
example, on obligations to develop software84 or to dismantle a factory.85 
Secondly, Article 35(2) CISG can also be used to determine conformity 
where the service provider owes an obligation du moyen or duty of 
reasonable care and skill. As mentioned above, Article 35(2) CISG provides 
an objective standard to evaluate conformity. In cases of obligations de 
moyens, one would simply ask: “what degree of reasonable care and skill 
would be expected in these circumstances from an objectively reasonable 
perspective?”. In each circumstance, this could encompass any particular 
purpose, sample or packaging. As such, courts applying Article 35(2) CISG 
to service contracts would essentially be replacing the word “goods” in the 
Article with the word “services.” This exercise of reading words into the 
CISG can be justified through one of two routes within the CISG. Firstly, 
according to Article 6 CISG, parties may vary the effect of any of the 
Convention’s provisions. As such, parties could agree to vary Article 35(2) 
CISG to replace the word “goods” with “services.”86 Secondly, the tribunal 
could undertake common-sense gap-filling to arrive at such a reading of 
Article 35(2) CISG.87 The argument for such an interpretation of Article 
35(2) CISG would apply a fortiori if parties to service contracts expressly opt 
into the CISG. 
Articles 41 and 42 CISG require the seller to deliver goods which are 
free from, firstly, general third-party property rights or claims and, secondly, 
                                                                                                                           
 
82 Some types of service contracts attract implied terms of strict liability in common law. See supra 
Part III.B. 
83 BARENDRECHT ET AL., supra note 51, at 134. 
84 Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Lyon, 3e civ., Dec. 18, 2003, 01/02620 (Fr). 
85 Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Grenoble, com., Apr. 26, 1995, 93/2879 (Fr). 
86 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 70, at 30. 
87 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 76. 
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third party intellectual property rights or claims. In the services context, 
while issues of general third-party rights will not usually pose a problem, 
third party intellectual property rights or claims are an especially important 
issue, one which the CISG is more adept than domestic systems at resolving. 
Take, for example, a scenario where a third-party developer has an 
intellectual property right to software that was developed in India and used 
in Germany. Domestic systems require the seller to guarantee that the goods 
are free from third party intellectual property rights worldwide.88 This would 
impose on the Indian developer the onerous task of investigating all 
potentially conflicting intellectual property rights worldwide. By contrast, 
Article 42 CISG requires the seller to guarantee only that the goods are free 
from third party intellectual property rights under the laws of narrow 
categories of countries: the place where the goods would be resold or the 
place of the buyer’s business. This resolves the issue faced by service 
providers who would otherwise be expected to have knowledge of all 
potentially conflicting rights worldwide. Thus, Articles 41 and 42 CISG are 
not only equally applicable to service contracts, they are also more suitable 
than domestic provisions which would otherwise govern this aspect of the 
contract. 
The CISG obliges the buyer to examine the goods (Article 38 CISG) 
and give notice to the seller of any non-conformity (Article 39 CISG) or 
third-party rights or claims (Article 43 CISG). If the buyer fails to do so, it 
loses the right to rely on potential non-conformity of the goods or on Articles 
41 and 42 CISG. Because of the absence of comprehensive, codified rules on 
service contracts in domestic jurisdictions, it might, at first glance, have 
seemed unlikely that legal systems would have considered the issue of notice 
requirements in service contracts. However, it appears that notice 
requirements do apply to service contracts in some contexts. For instance, 
under the Directive on Package Holidays,89 the consumer must communicate 
any failure in the performance of a contract to the supplier of the service. If 
such a duty is appropriate to impose on consumers, it is a fortiori appropriate 
to impose on commercial service users. This is nothing more than an 
expression of the principle of good faith and fair dealing in international 
                                                                                                                           
 
88 RUTH JANAL, THE SELLER’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIRD PARTY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS UNDER THE VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 205–26 (2008). 
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commerce. Thus it does not come as a surprise that the Principles of 
European Law on Service Contracts oblige the service-recipient to notify the 
service provider if it discovers that the service will fail or has failed to 
achieve the result it envisaged,90 and that the consequences of the service-
recipient’s failure to notify range from losing the right to rely on non-
conformity to compensating the service provider.91 It is also unsurprising that 
courts have already applied the rights and duties under Article 39 CISG to 
service obligations, notably in a contract for the development of software92 
and in a contract for design, installation and waste management.93 
According to Article 80 CISG, a party may not rely on a failure of the 
other party to perform to the extent that such failure was caused by the first 
party’s act or omission. Underlying Article 80 is the general principle that 
each party must account for its own sphere of risk.94 This principle is not 
restricted to sales contracts; it is generally applicable to any kind of 
contract,95 including service contracts. 
In conclusion, the CISG’s provisions on conformity, third party rights 
and claims, examination and notice of defects and causation are equally 
suitable to establish whether contracts for the supply of services have been 
breached. 
2. Remedies 
The remedies provisions of the CISG are also suitable to govern service 
contracts. Both sale of goods and supply of service provisions are specialized 
rules of general contract law, and so it follows that the rules governing breach 
of a services contract are virtually the same as those governing breach of a 
sales contract.96 There is no question that the seller’s remedies against the 
                                                                                                                           
 
90 BARENDRECHT ET AL., supra note 51, at 278. 
91 Id. at 283–85. 
92 Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Lyon, 3e civ., Dec. 18, 2003, 01/02620 (Fr.). 
93 Landgericht [LG] [district court] Mainz, Nov. 26, 1998, 12 HKO 70/97 (Ger.); see also 
Rechtbanken van Koophandel [Kh.] [commerce tribunals] Hasselt, Feb. 4, 2004, AR 04/267 (Belg.) 
(stating that the rules on notice in the CISG applied to the services part of the relevant contract). 
94 PETER SCHLECHTRIEM & INGEBORG SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON 
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 1155–56 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., Oxford Univ. Press 4th ed. 
2016); see also Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 42(2)(b), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3. 
95 Art. 7.1.2 UNIDROIT Principles 2010. 
96 Law Commission, Law of Contr act: Implied Terms in Contracts for the Supply of Services 
(1979), Law Com. No. 95 (U.K.). 
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buyer (set out in Article 61 CISG) are very well suited for the service 
provider too. Thus, the service provider may claim for the price (Article 62 
CISG), fix additional time for the service-recipient’s performance (Article 63 
CISG), declare the contract avoided upon fundamental breach (Article 64 
CISG) and specify certain features of the service itself in default of the 
service-recipient doing so as required under the contract (Article 65 CISG). 
It is suitability of the buyer’s remedies against the seller for the service-
recipient that is more controversial. Thus, the following remedies will be 
considered in the context of service contracts: specific performance (Articles 
28, 46(2) and 46(3) CISG), avoidance (Articles 49(1)(a), 51 and 25 CISG), 
damages (Article 74 CISG), exemption (Article 79 CISG) and price 
reduction (Article 50 CISG). 
Under the CISG, while specific performance is generally available, a 
court is not bound to enter a judgment for specific performance unless it 
would do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts (Article 28 
CISG). The lack of case law on Article 28 CISG suggests that, in practice, 
commercial parties do not rely on this expansive remedy.97 In cases of non-
conformity, specific performance assumes the guise of replacement and 
repair, addressed in Articles 46(2) and 46(3) CISG. It has been argued that 
specific performance cannot be available in-service contracts because 
defective performance cannot be cured without contemporaneous 
cooperation from the aggrieved party.98 This objection is misplaced. It is in 
the very nature of an order for specific performance, in a sales context or any 
other, that the aggrieved party’s cooperation will be required, not least in its 
patience while the defective performance is cured. There does not appear to 
be any good reason why the CISG’s remedy of specific performance cannot 
also be suitably applied to service contracts.99 Indeed, Article 46(3) CISG has 
already been used to determine whether a seller had cured its defective 
dismantling of a factory by replacing the parts which were damaged during 
the dismantling.100 
Avoidance is the most onerous remedy for breach of contract. Thus, in 
line with the common law approach, both the CISG and the UNIDROIT 
                                                                                                                           
 
97 SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 94, at 483–85. 
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principles grant avoidance only in cases of fundamental breach.101 That many 
domestic legal systems follow this approach, applying it to all kinds of 
contracts including service contracts,102 suggests it is equally appropriate for 
the CISG to approach the avoidance of service contracts on the same basis. 
Indeed, Articles 25 and 49 CISG have already been used to determine 
whether breach of an obligation to dismantle a factory can amount to 
fundamental breach and thereby justify avoidance.103 As Schlechtriem rightly 
explains, if the non-performance itself constitutes fundamental breach, such 
as when installation is not completed by a stipulated date, the services portion 
of the contract can be avoided, enabling the buyer to purchase services 
elsewhere and claim the additional expenses as damages under Article 75 
CISG.104 Likewise the so-called Nachfrist principle,105 according to which an 
original non-fundamental breach arising from non-performance may 
constitute a fundamental breach if the party does not adhere to the additional 
period fixed for performance, is suitable to apply to service contracts.106 
Modern provisions on damages, such as those in Article 74 CISG or 
Articles 7.4.2 and 7.4.4 UNIDROIT Principles, provide for full 
compensation of reasonably foreseeable losses flowing from the breach. This 
rule can be traced to the seminal common law case Hadley v. Baxendale 
                                                                                                                           
 
101 Contracts for the International Sale of Goods arts. 49(1)(a), 51, 25, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3; arts. 
7.3.1(1), (2) UNIDROIT Principles 2010. 
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154. 
104 Peter Schlechtriem, Interpretation, Gap Filling and Further Development of the UN Sales 
Convention, 16 PACE INT’L L. REV. 279, 295–96 (2004). 
105 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.97/18, art. 49(1)(b) (1983) (opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980); INT’L INST. FOR THE 
UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE L. [UNIDROIT], Principles of International Commercial Contracts arts. 
7.3.1(3), 7.1.5. 
106 Schlechtriem, supra note 104, at 295–96. 
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which, incidentally, concerned the breach of a service obligation in a contract 
for the transport of a crankshaft.107 Courts have not in the past had problems 
applying Article 74 CISG to service obligations in mixed contracts, for 
instance, in a contract for construction, transport, assembly and initial 
operation of a processing center.108 There should be little dispute that the 
CISG damages provisions can be applied to service contracts.109 
Article 79 CISG exempts a party from liability in damages if breach is 
due to an unforeseeable impediment beyond its control.110 It represents a 
middle ground between the narrow common law doctrine of frustration and 
the wider fault principle found in most civil law jurisdictions. In most cases, 
the decisive element is whether the impediment was “beyond [the party’s] 
control.” As with its application in sale of goods cases, Article 79 CISG is 
equally capable of exempting a party to a services contract that is under an 
obligation de résultat. The question remains how Article 79 CISG would 
regulate an alleged breach of obligations de moyens. If a party complies with 
its duty to take reasonable care and skill, there is no breach under Article 35 
CISG and so exemption under Article 79 CISG would not be in issue. If, 
however, a party does not comply with its obligation de moyens and so is in 
breach under Article 35 CISG, Article 79 CISG might be pleaded as a way 
of exempting the promisor from paying damages. This could happen in a 
situation where it is not only the service provider that is responsible for the 
breach. For instance, in a contract for the delivery, erection, and installation 
of wall partitions, the court applied Article 79 CISG to exempt the supplier 
from liability for the defective installation (unintended gaps between the top 
of the partitions and the ceiling) because the defective installation was carried 
out by a third party.111 Thus, the service provider is exempted because the 
failure to perform is due to an impediment beyond its control. One of the 
deciding factors should, as with sale of goods cases, be the sphere of risk 
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108 Tribunal de Commerce [Comm.] [Commerce Tribunal] de Namur, Jan. 15, 2002, RG No. 
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service provider. Only external objective circumstances outside of the sphere 
of risk of the service provider should be taken into account. When defining 
the sphere of risk, the court should consider the contractual allocation of risk 
(alternatively, practices and usages of the parties), the reasonableness of the 
service provider’s failure to take the impediment into account at the time of 
contract formation, and the difficulty for the service provider to overcome 
the impediment or its consequences.112 Increased costs of performing the 
service should not suffice for exemption. As such, Article 79 CISG may 
govern service contracts. 
In cases of non-conformity, the CISG gives the buyer a right to reduce 
the purchase price.113 While this remedy is indispensable in civil law because 
of the exceptional nature of a damages award, it is not known to the common 
law. For this reason, it is disputed whether the price reduction remedy can be 
applied to service contracts. Some authors opine that price reduction is not 
suitable in a services context because there is no market price for services.114 
This argument is not convincing. Price reduction is nothing more than a 
partial avoidance of the contract. The French Civil Code now provides for 
price reduction in its general part of obligations thus applying it to all kinds 
of contracts, including service contracts.115 Following this reasoning, the 
CISG price reduction remedy should also be applied to service contracts.116 
A further argument made against the inclusion of services in the ambit 
of the CISG is that services are typically rendered under long-term 
contracts.117 In these contexts, an important issue is the effect on long-term 
obligations of a short-term breach of contract—an issue, it is argued, the 
CISG is not suitable to govern. However, the CISG itself contains a provision 
dealing with installment contracts that is suitable for any long-term contract. 
According to Article 73(1) CISG, in a case of fundamental breach of contract, 
a partial non-conformity primarily allows the obligee to avoid the contract 
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with respect to the part concerned. If there are good grounds to conclude that 
a fundamental breach will occur with respect to future performances, the 
promisee may avoid the contract for the future (Article 73(2) CISG).118 In 
addition, a buyer who declares the contract avoided in respect of any single 
performance may at the same time declare the contract void in respect of past 
or future performances of the same obligation if the respective obligations 
are interdependent (Article 73(3) CISG).119 Evidently, these provisions are 
capable of governing services rendered under long-term contracts. 
Finally, it is further argued that service contracts typically require both 
parties to work closely together, and that the sales provisions of the CISG are 
incapable of dealing with this kind of relationship.120 However, practice 
shows that such close cooperation is also a common feature of complex sales 
contracts. Any questions of apportioning liability between the parties can be 
addressed using Article 80 CISG, which allows for an attribution of liability 
to the extent that the failure has been caused by the respective party.121 
In sum, both the liabilities and remedies provisions of the CISG are 
suitable to govern service contracts. To overcome the obstacles posed by 
Article 3(2) CISG and for the avoidance of doubt, parties to contracts 
containing service obligations may wish to “opt-in” to the application of the 
CISG to their contracts.122 
V. CONCLUSION 
Both the CISG and its earlier iterations envisaged a convention that 
would govern the international sale of goods. Despite allowing the 
Convention to govern service obligations, its drafters thus limited its 
application to those contracts that are, in the main, for the sale of goods. 
While the decision to exclude service contracts (in their guise either as pure 
service contracts or as mixed contracts which are predominantly for the 
supply of services) may have been a reasonable one, it was nonetheless a 
decision without valid justification. The exclusion aimed to secure the 
overriding aim of consensus by reflecting domestic legal tradition on the 
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issue of the scope of the Convention. Yet it failed to recognize the difficulties 
associated with such differential treatment that domestic jurisdictions 
themselves face: the absence of a clear and consistent basis upon which to 
distinguish sales and service contracts, and the failure to treat like cases alike 
by imposing starkly different consequences of classification. 
Amidst the confusing and outdated distinctions drawn by domestic 
jurisdictions, the CISG holds great potential to lead the way in the application 
of a single legal instrument to contexts in which sales and services are closely 
intertwined and in contexts of pure service contracts. This approach makes 
theoretical and practical sense. Above all, it would greatly enhance 
predictability in international trade by avoiding conflict-of-laws disputes 
about the law applicable to the services part of the contract. The Convention 
was expressly designed to apply to service obligations, albeit those contained 
within sales contracts, and it has indeed been so applied without difficulty. 
This supports the proposition that the Convention in its current form is 
suitable to govern service contracts. 
